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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
BOUNTIFUL WATER SUB CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
8426

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH, ET AL.,
Defendants .and Appellants. 1

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Prior to July 1, 1955, the Board of Directors of the
Bountiful Subconservancy District ("respondent") fixed
a general property tax levy of one-half mill upon the taxable
property within the subdistrict's boundaries. In conformity
with law, said subdistrict certified to the Board of County

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

Commissioners of Davis County ("appellants") the rate so
fixed, and directed the levy. The appellants, pursuant to
Section 59-9-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, filed a statement with the State Tax Commission showing the amount
and purpose of all taxes fixed by appellants, including the
subdistrict levy. The Tax Commission, upon the advice of
its legal division and the Attorney General of Utah held
that the subdistrict levy had no foundation in law and
therefore the county levy exceeded its permissable limit.
The appellant therefore set aside the levy certified by respondent.
On September 17, 1955, respondents filed a complaint
in the District Court of the Second Judicial District in and
for Davis County, State of Utah, praying that appellants
be required to levy the tax in question. The case was tried
before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist on the 21st day
of September, 1955 (R. 5). On the 27th day of September,
1955, the Court filed its findings of fact and conclusions
of law, finding in substance that respondent is a public
corporation ; that respondent had fixed a tax levy of onehalf mill on property within its boundat·ies in conformity
with law; that appellants had been directed, but refused
to levy the amount (R. 5, 6). The Court concluded that the
state legislature intended to confer upon subconservancy
districts the power to levy a general property tax on taxable property within its boundaries, and that respondent
was so entitled (R. 6, 7). The Court adjudged and ordered
appellants to levy a tax of one-half mill on all taxable property within the limits of respondent's boundaries for the
year 1955, and to collect and remit the same to respondent
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(R. 8). Thereafter, on the 28th day of September, 1955,
appellants filed their notice of appeal from such judgment
(R. 23).

The bases upon which the appellants set aside the ad
valorem tax levy of respondents, and the bases upon which
this appeal is taken are that: (1) The Utah statutes do
not confer upon subconservancy districts the power of
general property taxation; (2) the power to tax must be
express or necessarily implied; (3) the nature of a subconservancy district precludes the necessity of a general
property tax.
It is our conviction that the purpose for which a subconservancy district is organized is that of satisfying local
problems and improving particular lands. Primarily charged
with the function of distributing water, a subconservancy
district should derive its revenues from those land owners
who benefit directly therefrom and in direct proportion to
the improvement received.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY ACT
DOES NOT CONFER THE POWER OF AD
VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION UPON
WATER SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICTS.
(A). THE POWERS AND DUTIES CONFERRED UPON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
OF A SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICT BY
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CHAPTER 120, LAWS OF UTAH 1951, ARE
THOSE MANAGERIAL POWERS AND DUTIES ENUMERATED IN SECTION 100-11-13,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, (73-9-13,
U. C. A., 1953).
(B). THE MAXIMUM AD VALOREM TAX
LEVY AUTHORIZED FOR WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICTS vV AS NOT INTENDED TO
APPLY TO SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICTS.
(C). WHERE THE INTENT OF AN ALLEGED TAX STATUTE IS AMBIGUOUS OR
DOUBTFUL, IT MUST BE RESOLVED IN
FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYER AND AGAINST
THE TAXING AUTHORITY.
POINT II
THE POWER TO TAX MUST BE EXPRESS
IN NATURE AND CANNOT BE IMPLIED IN
TAXATION STATUTES.
POINT III
THE TITLE OF CHAPTER 120, LAWS OF
UTAH 1951, PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF SUBDISTRICTS, DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY APPRISE THE LEGISLATURE
THAT THE BODY OF THE ACT WAS TO
HAVE INCLUDED THE ALLEGED POWER
OF AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION
BY SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICTS.
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POINT IV
TO ALLOW A SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICT
THE POWER OF AD VALOREM PROPERTY
TAXATION RESULTS IN DOUBLE TAXATION
WHICH IS TO BE A VOIDED AND NOT PRESUMED.
POINT V
THE NATURE OF A SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICT PRECLUDES THE NECESSITY OF AD
VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY ACT
DOES NOT CONFER THE POWER OF AD
VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION UPON
WATER SUBCONSERV ANCY DISTRICTS.
(A). THE POWERS AND DUTIES CONFERRED UPON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
OF A SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICT BY
CHAPTER 120, LAWS OF UTAH 1951, ARE
THOSE MANAGERIAL POWERS AND DUTIES ENUMERATED IN SECTION 100-11-13,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, (73-9-13,
U. C. A., 1953).
An analysis of the Utah statutes, especially the Utah
Water Conservancy Act, Chapter 9 of Title 73, Utah Code
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Annotated, 1953, gives no indication that the legislature
conferred upon subconservancy districts the power to levy
an ad valorem property tax. There is no express provision
granting such a power, nor can it be necessarily implied
from the statute in point.
According to the case of Patterick v. Carbon Water
Conservancy District et al., 106 Utah 55, 145 P. 2d 503,
1944, the Utah Water Conservancy Act is patterned after
the Colorado Water Conservancy statute. The latter act
makes provision for the organization of subdistricts under
Section 149-6-15, Colorado Revised Statutes 1953, which
in essential respects is identical with Section 100-11-14,
Utah Code Annotated 1943, the original Utah statute providing for subdistricts. Those statutes state in part as
follows:
"Whenever the court shall by its order duly
entered of record, declare and decree such subdistricts to be organized, the clerk of said court shall
thereupon give notice of such order to the directors
of the district who shall thereupon act also as directors of the subdistrict. Thereafter, the proceedings
in reference to the subdistrict shall in all matters
conform to the provision of this act except that in
the appraisal of benefits for the purpose of S'tWk
subdistricts, in the issuance of bonds, in levying of
assessments and in aU other matters affecting only
the subdistricts, the provisions of this act shall apply
to the subdistrict as though it were an independent
district, and it shall not in these things be amalgamated with the main district. The said petition for
organization of a subdistrict shall also contain a
statement of the amount or quantity of water for
which said subdistrict desires to acquire the per-
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petual use and the amount of money that said subdistrict is willing to pay therefor, and the court
shall, prior to the entry of its decree organizing any
territory into a subdistrict obtain the verified consent of the board to furnish such perpetual use of
water for the purposes therein specified to such subdistricts at a price and upon the term mentioned in
the petition, then the court shall be authorized to
enter its decree of organization of such subdistrict."
(Emphasis added.)
There have been no decisions in Colorado or Utah construing the foregoing provision as embracing the power
of ad valorem property taxation, nor has it been asserted
in this action that a subdistrict formerly had the power
to levy a general property tax under that statute. Furthermore, the present status of conservancy districts in
Colorado is indicative that an interpretation permitting
such a power would be a strained one.
For example, under Articles 8 and 9 of Chapter 149,
Colorado Revised Statutes 1953, the Colorado River Conservancy District and the Southwestern Water Conservancy
District were created by legislative enactment, with provision therein for organizing subdistricts. Both chapters
provide expressly for maintenance taxation by a subdistrict
and enumerate the levy limitations and procedure for such
taxation. Such express authorization is not present in the
general Colorado Water Conservancy Act. It is not present
in the Utah Water Conservancy Act and cannot be necessarily implied. It is therefore submitted that there was
no power for a subdistrict to levy a general property tax
under the original Utah statute dealing with subdistricts,
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and that the amendments thereto have not conferred the
power.
Respondents, however, contended in the lower court
that a 1951 amendment to the Utah Water Conservancy
Act delegated the power of ad valorem property taxation
to a subconservancy district. That amendment, Chapter
120, Laws of Utah, 1951, provides as follows:
"Subdistricts may be organized upon the petition of the owners of real property, within or partly
within and partly without the district, which petition shall be in substantially the same form and shall
fulfill the same requirements concerning the subdistricts as the petition outlined in section 4 of this
chapter as amended is required to fulfill, concerning the organization of the main district. Such petition shall also contain a statement of the quantity
of water which the subdistrict proposes to acquire
from the district for perpetual use and the court
shall, prior to the entry of its decree organizing a
subdistrict, require that the petitioners attach to the
petition written evidence of the consent of the board
of directors of the district to furnish to such subdistrict the perpetual use of water for the purpose
therein specified. Petitions for the organization of
subdistricts shall be filed with the clerk of the court
and shall be accompanied by a bond as provided for
in section 5 of this chapter. The procedure for the
organization of subdistricts shall be the same as
for the organization of districts, except that the
provisions of section 4 of this chapter as amended
respecting the minimum assessed value of land and
improvements within districts shall not apply to subdistricts. A subdistrict shall be a separate entity
within the district and shall have authority to contact with the district for the furnishing of water
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and for other purposes. Within thirty days after
entering the decree incorporating a subdistrict, the
court shall appoint a board of directors of not exceeding seven persons who are owners of real property in the subdistrict, and who are not directors of
the district. The provisions of section 9 of this chapter as amended, except as to the number of directors,
shall be applicable to subdistricts. The board of
directors of a subdistrict shall have the same powers
and duties as a district board."
The foregoing amendment confers no express authorization to levy a general property tax.
It is submitted that when the legislators passed Chapter 120, Laws of Utah 1951, their minds were directed to
Section 100-11-13, Utah Code Annotated 1943, (73-9-13, U.
C. A. 1953), as enumerating the powers and duties conferred upon a subconservancy district board by that phrase
which provides that a subdistrict "shall have the same
powers and duties as a district board." Section 73-9-13,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, is specifically entitled, "Powers
of board of district". It does not include the power of general property taxation, but does enumerate those managerial powers necessary for the perpetuation of a conservancy
district. Because of the heading of Section 73-9-13 and the
fact that the same precedes the provision establishing subdistricts, it is both reasonable and logical to conclude that
the legislature intended that those powers and duties
granted in Chapter 120 were those enumerated in Section
73-9-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
It is apparent from an analysis of the Water Conservancy Act and the amendment thereto (Chapter 120, Laws
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of Utah 1951) that the primary concern of the legislature
in passing the amendment was to change the governmental
structure of a subconservancy district including the number and qualifications of the Board of Directors and the
provision that the boards of the parent and subdistricts
must be composed of different personnel. Such change in
governmental structure required a delegation of managerial
powers to the subconservancy district board. Inasmuch as
there has been no allegation or claim that a subconservancy
district had the power of ad valorem property taxation prior
to the 1951 amendment, the mere change in the governmental structure of a subconservancy district cannot necessarily imply that the subdistrict acquired all of the powers of a parent conservancy district, including that of raising revenue through a general property tax. This is particularly true where the statute provides other sources of
revenue. (The latter point will be discussed under Point
III herein.)
(B). THE MAXIMUM AD VALOREM TAX
LEVY AUTHORIZED FOR WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICTS WAS NOT INTENDED TO
APPLY TO SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICTS.
Under Section 73-9-16, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, a
district may levy and collect a general property tax within
certain maximum rates. A relevant part of that section
provides:
"To levy and collect taxes under class A as
herein provided, the board shall, in each year, determine the amount of money necessary to be raised
by taxation, taking into consideration other sources
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of revenue of the district, and shall fix a rate of levy
which when levied upon every dollar of assessed
valuation of property within the district, and with
other revenues will raise the amount required by
the district, to supply funds for paying expenses of
organization, for surveys and plans, paying the cost
of construction, operating and maintaining the
works of the district; provided, however, that said
rate shall not exceed one-half mill on the dollar, prior
to the commencement of construction of the works,
and thereafter not to exceed one mill on the dollar,
of assessed valuation of the property within the
district; provided further, that in districts to be
served by water apportioned by the Colorado River
Compact to the Lower Basin, the levy after construction may be increased to not to exceed five mills on
the dollar of assessed valuation of property within
the district." (Emphasis added.)
Did the Legislature intend that a subconservancy district
should have the same powers of ad valorem property taxation as a parent conservancy district, and are the maximum
levies authorized under the above statute to apply in the
case of the subdistrict?
According to respondent's position, if a subconservancy
district is organized within a parent conservancy district
served by water apportioned by the Colorado River Compact to the Lower Basin, the levy limit of the subdistrict's
taxation power would be five mills, the same as the power
of a main district. Such a result might produce a total water
conservancy tax of ten mills on all property within the subdistrict. Claimants of a subconservancy district's power to
tax general property must face the possible ten mill levy
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as the logical result of their position. While it is within
the power of the legislature to authorize such a tax, the
levy amount is of importance in ascertaining legislative
intent. It is submitted that the peculiar structure of the
levy maximum amendment is evidence that the legislature
did not intend that a subconservancy district should have
the power of general property taxation, the 5-mill authorization being only applicable to a parent conservancy district. The fact that the act quoted places a levy limit which
a district shall "not exceed" indicates the reluctance of
the Legislature to impose a burden greater than that specified upon the property owners of the district. The potential levy that might result if respondent's position is
adopted, raises a serious question of legislative intent, and
would subject property owners in certain parts of the state
to an undue tax burden, the authorization for which has
no foundation in our law.
Furthermore, testimony presented in the lower court
reveals that the present section, codified as 73-9-16, U. C.
A. 1953, was an amendment enacted in 1951, changing the
levy maximum for those districts affected by the Colorado
River Compact water allotment to the Lower Basin. Evidence indicated that the legislative committee which considered the 1951 amendment (Chapter 121), was not concerned with, or did it anticipate that the five mill maximum
applied to a subdistrict (R. 18). If the five mill levy did not
apply to subdistricts organized in areas served by the Colorado River Compact (Lower Basin), logical reasoning would
lead to the conclusion that the one mill levy maximum also
does not apply to subconservancy districts of the state. It
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is unreasonable to assume that the Legislature would delegate the power of general property taxation to a subdistrict
without placing a maximum limit or restriction thereon.
Therefore, with no statute specifying a limit for the alleged
tax power, there is serious doubt as to whether it was
intended that the subconservancy district should have the
power of general property taxation.
During the regular session of the 1951 Legislature, two
amendments were introduced and passed affecting the
Water Conservancy Act. Chapter 120 relating to the water
conservancy districts and the organization of subdistricts,
originated in the Senate as S. B. 225 and was passed on
March 8, 1951. Chapter 121, which related to water conservancy districts and the limiting of general property tax
levies, originated in the House of Representatives as H. B.
133, and it was passed March 8, 1951. It is to be noted that
the bills in question originated in separate houses ; that
there was no reference in either bill to the other, and no
material connection between the acts. There has been no
assertion that a joint committee of both houses considered
the bills, nor that any of the legislators contemplated that
the legislation referred to was related. It is submitted that
this court should not find any basis for concluding that
Chapters 120 and 121, Laws· of Utah 1951, were related
in substance, but rather that their passage in the same
session of the Legislature was the result of separate legislative bodies considering two different and separate needs
of the water conservancy program.
In construing the legislative intent in enacting Chapter 120, Laws of Utah, 1951, it should be noted that the bill
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was passed at the conclusion of the legislative session and
no dissenting vote is recorded. This factor, while not controlling, raises some question as to whether the Legislature
considered Chapter 120 as including the power of ad valorem taxation by subconservancy district since no opposition in recorded to the passage of the act-a feature not
typical of the enactment of tax statutes.
(C). \VHERE THE INTENT OF AN ALLEGED TAX STATUTE IS AMBIGUOUS OR
DOUBTFUL, IT MUST BE RESOLVED IN
FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYER AND AGAINST
THE TAXING AUTHORITY.
It is a general principle of law that tax statutes doubtful in meaning are to be construed against the taxing
authority and in favor of the taxpayer. 51 Am. Jur., Taxation, Section 316, p. 366. The leading treatise on taxation,
Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 1, 4th Ed., Section 83, states:

"Constitutional provisions or statutes, claimed
to delegate the power to tax, will be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer, in determining
whether any power of taxation has been delegated
and also, where it is conceded that some power to
tax has been delegated, in determining the scope
of the delegated powe'i*." (see also Sec. 507.)
Utah has applied the above principle and in the case of
Norville v. The State Tax Commission, 98 U. 170, 97 P. 2d
937, this court stated:
"The doctrine that taxing statutes are, in case
of doubt as to the intention of the legislature to be,
construed strictly against the taxing authority and
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in favor of those on whom the tax is levied, has
been well set out in the case of H elvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 55 S. Ct. 50, 79
L. Ed. 211."
See, also, Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co. v. Richards·, 52 Utah
1, 172 P. 474; "F?. F. Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Commission, 90 Utah 359, 61 P. 2d 629.
The South Carolina Suprerne Court has referred to the
above principle as "a salutary rule and one which is for
the protection of the taxpayer against the arm of a taxing
body." Pacolet Mfg. Co. v. Query, et al., 174 S. C. 359,
177 S. E. 653. This rationale explains the reluctance of
courts to imply taxing powers and impose a burden upon
taxpayers beyond that which is expressly stipulated in
legislation. Sections 73-9-15, 16 and 18, U. C. A. 1953
reflect such ambiguity or doubt regarding the power of
ad valorem property taxation by subconservancy districts
that the foregoing rules of law should apply and the doubts
be resolved in favor of the taxpayer.
The alleged ad valorem tax power of a subdistrict must
find its origin in Section 73-9-15, U. C. A., 1953, if any
place. That section provides that parent districts may raise
revenue by various methods or combinations thereof, as
follows:
"In addition to the other means of providing
revenue for such districts as herein provided, the
board shall have power and authority to levy and
collect taxes and special assessments for maintaining and operating such works and paying the obligations and indebtedness of the district by any one
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or more of the methods or combinations thereof,
classified as follows:
"Class A. To levy and collect taxes upon all
property within the district as hereinafter provided.
"Class B. To levy and collect assessments for
special benefits accruing to property within municipalities for which use of water is allotted as hereinafter provided.
"Class C. To levy and collect assessments for
special benefits accruing to lands within irrigation
districts for which use of water is allotted as hereinafter provided.
"Class D. To levy and collect assessments for
special benefits accruing to lands for which use of
water is allotted as hereinafter provided."
If a subdistrict has the same powers of taxation as a
parent district, one would expect to find that a subdistrict
could freely levy under Classes A, B, C, and D as set forth
above. But such is not the case. Sections 73-9-17 through
19, U. C. A. 1953, give amplification and clarification to
the manner and method of levying those taxes under Class
B, C, and D, as set forth in Section 73-9-15, U. C. A. 1953
quoted above. Under Class C a district board may sell or
lease water to irrigation districts. Under 73-9-18, U. C. A.
1953, as amended, the procedure outlined for the lease or
sale provides that should an irrigation district desire to
purchase or obtain the beneficial use of the water of a
water conservancy district, the board of such irrigation
district shall, by resolution, authorize and direct its president and secretary to petition for an allotment of water
upon certain terms which are not pertinent for our discussion here. The water conservancy district board of directors
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may hear the petition and any objections thereto. Section
73-9-18 as arnended then provides further:
"The board may, at its discretion, accept or
reject the said petition, but if it deems it for the
best interest of the district that said petition shall
be granted, shall enter an order to that effect granting the said petition, and from and after such order,
the irrigation district, andjor persons therein shall
be deemed to have purchased, leased, or otherwise
acquired the beneficial use of water as set forth in
said order. If said petition is granted, the board
shall, in each year, determine the amount of money
necessary to be raised by special assessment on
lands within such irrigation district and shall determine whether such special assessment shall be
levied by the district or by the irrigation district.
If the board determines that such assessments shall
be levied by the district, it shall certify to the county
assessor of the county in which the lands of such
irrigation district are located the amount of the
assessment, plus a fair proportionate amount of the
estimated operating and maintenance charges for
the next succeeding year on each tract of land on or
before the first day of July of each year, and such
county assessor shall extend the amount of such
special assessment, plus said operating and maintenance charges on the tax roll as a special assessment
against the lands on which said special assessment
is made. If the board determines that such assessments shall be levied by the irrigation district, the
district shall make a contract with the irrigation
district which shall provide among other things for
the annual payment to the district of an amount to
be obtained from the levy by the irrigation district
of annual assessments in accordance with the irrigation district law. If subdistrict or subdistricts
are organized as herein provided, assessments of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1~

special benefits shall be made, spread on the taa:
rolls and collected in the same manner as herein
provided in the case of irrigation districts." (Emphasis added.)
It is to be noted that if a subdistrict is organized as

provided under the Water Conservancy Act, special assessments are to be made and collected as provided in the case
of irrigation districts. Such procedure would require that
the board of a subdistrict must petition the board of the
parent district for the purchase of water and that the parent
board may, at its discretion, accept or reject the petition;
that the parent board shall determine the amount of money
necessary to be raised by special assessment ; and that the
parent board shall determine whether suck special assessment shall be levied by the district or by the subdistrict.
Section 73-9-18, supra, therefore, indicates that a subdistrict
is subordinate to the parent district and is dependent upon
the approval and determination of the parent district regarding the amount of money that may be raised by special
assessment and the manner in which it shall be collected.
If a subdistrict has the same taxation powers as a
parent district, it is submitted that a subdistrict would in
no way be dependent upon the approval or determination
of a parent district to levy a special assessments tax, nor
would it be required to be bound by the decision of a parent
district that a contemplated purchase of water would be for
the best interest of the area affected. In fact, if a subdistrict has the taxation powers of a parent district, then it
should be able to levy and collect assessments for special
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benefits without the approval or decisiOn of any other
political subdivision of the state.
If a subdistrict does not have the same power as a

parent district to freely levy and collect special benefits
assessments under Class C as set forth in Section 73-9-15,
U. C. A. 1953, there is serious question whether it has the
power to levy and collect taxes upon general property as set
forth in Class A thereof, which is the source from which its
alleged taxing power must emanate.
That the treatment of a subdistrict under Class C is
not an exception or limitation to other powers of taxation
is evident from an analysis of the history of Section 73-9-18,
U. C. A. 1953. Under the 1941 Water Conservancy Act,
there was never an allegation or claim that a subconservancy district had the power to levy a general property
tax. Section 100-11-14, U. C. A. 1943, contemplates a special
assessments tax that might be levied by a subdistrict, but
grants no additional taxation powers and inasmuch as the
directors of the parent conservancy district and subdistrict
were to be the same individuals under that legislation, the
powers of the subdistrict were largely dependent upon the
decisions and determinations of the board of directors when
acting as the board of the parent district. The section now
codified as 73-9-18, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, is the result
of several amendments passed since 1941, but each amendment has contained the provision that if subdistricts are
organized, the assessments of special benefits should be
made and collected in the same manner as in a case of
irrigation districts, that is, in the manner to be determined
by the parent district. Section 1 of Chapter 132, Laws of
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Utah 1953, now codified as 73-9-18, U. C. A. 1953, as
amended, reflects the most recent pronouncement regarding the manner of making and collecting special assessments
by a subdistrict, and reflects the legislative intent to limit
the scope of a subconservancy district's tax power.
The holding of the district court that a subdistrict had
the same powers of taxation as a parent district was in
contravention of legislative fiat and did not give due
consideration to the manner and method of making and
collecting special benefits tax as outlined in Section 73-9-18,
U. C. A. 1953, as amended. The court below erred in placing
no limitation on a subconservancy district's power of taxation by authorizing that Classes A, B, C, and D under
Section 73-9-15, U. C. A. 1953, may be freely levied
and assessed by a subdistrict without regard for the
limitation specified by the Legislature. It is submitted that
Section 73-9-18, U. C. A. 1953, raises such doubt as to the
intent of the Legislature regarding the general property
taxation power of a subconservancy district that the general
rules of tax statute interpretation should be applied and the
ambiguity resolved in favor of the taxpayer.
POINT II
THE PO\VER TO TAX MUST BE EXPRESS
IN NATURE AND CANNOT BE IMPLIED IN
TAXATION STATUTES.
It is a general rule of law that a tax cannot be imposed
without clear and express language, and words of a tax
statute must be given ordinary meaning and may not be
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extended by implication. In the case of Sayles v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 286 Mass. 102, 189
N. E. 579, the court stated:
"In construing the statute we have in mind that
tax statutes must be construed strictly, and that the
power to tax must be found expressed in apt words
and cannot be deduced by implication." (Emphasis
ours.)

Osgood v. Tax Commissioner, 235 Mass. 88, 126 N. E. 371;
Deblois v. Commissioner of CoTporations and Taxation, 276
Mass. 437, 177 N. E. 566. Also 51 Am. Jur., Taxation, Section 310, and cases cited therein.
In the case before this court, there is no express statutory authorization granting the power of ad valorem
property taxation to a subconservancy district. Therefore,
it is submitted that the foregoing principle of law should
apply, and the power denied.
We are aware that under certain circumstances courts
have departed from the general rule above and held that a
municipal corporation's tax power may be granted by necessary implication. However, it is our conviction that a
subconservancy district qualifies neither as a municipality
nor quasi municipality. According to Lehi City v. Meiling,
87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530, a state agency is quasi municipal
in nature only if it serves a public purpose or benefit. A
conservancy district meets such a test, but the subdistrict
does not, for it is submitted that its object is to benefit local
interests or improve particular lands. Therefore, whatever
exceptions to the general rule of tax statute interpretation
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are applicable in the case of a municipality should not be
material here.
Nevertheless, should it be found that a subconservancy
district is quasi municipal in nature and sufficiently similar
to a municipality to invoke the exception noted, this court
should nevertheless follow the proposition that tax powers
of a municipality are subject to strict statutory construction.
As is stated in 1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th
Ed., Vol. 1, § 237, p. 448-50:
"It is a general and undisputed proposition of
law that a municipal corporation can possess and
can exercise the following powers, and no others:
First, those granted in express words; second, those
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the
powers expressly granted ; third, those essential to
the accomplishment of the declared objects and
purposes of the corporation,-not simply convenient,
but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial
doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved
by the courts against the corporation, and the power
is denied."

The foregoing statement has received acceptance by
this court in Nasfell v. Ogden City, (Utah), 249 P. 2d
507, Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Ut. 504, 124 P. 2d 537,
and cases cited therein.
In the case of l'rloss v. The Board of Commissioners of
Salt Lake City, 1 Utah 2d 60, 261 P. 2d 961, this court
stated:
"The City's power to tax is derived solely from
legislative enactment and it has only such authority

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
as is expressly conferred or necessarily implied.
This court has not favored the extension of the
powers of the city by implication, and the only modification of such doctrine is where the power is one
which is necessarily implied. Unless this requirement is met, the power cannot be deduced from any
consideration of convenience or necessity, or desirability of such result, and no doubtful inference from
other powers granted or from ambiguous or uncertain provisions of the law would be sufficient to
sustain such authority. This is a fortiori true in the
instant situation, because in case of any ambiguity
or uncertainty as to authority to impose taxes, the
doubt must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer."
(Emphasis added.)
In view of the foregoing authority a municipal corporation may not exercise powers by implication unless such
power is necessarily implied. Inasmuch as there can be no
necessary implication in the case before us, and since the
power of general property taxation cannot be deduced from
any consideration of convenience or necessity, the same
should not be allowed here.
The Water Conservancy Act gives such power to subdistricts under the section entitled, "Powers of a board of
district", that certain sources of funds are available and
are sufficient to meet the needs contemplated. Under subsection (m) of Section 73-9-13, U. C. A. 1953, a subconservancy district has power to borrow money and incur
indebtedness. It has power under subsection (f) to levy a
special assessments tax, as clarified in Section 73-9-18, U.
C. A. 1953, as amended, which outlines the procedure of
collecting and making said levy. Subsection (g) of Section
73-9-13 provides the power to fix rates at which water may
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be sold, leased or otherwise disposed of. Subsection (q) of
the same section, as amended in 1953, authorizes the sale
of water or water service to individual customers at specified rates. Subsection (r) allows the district or, in this
case, the subdistrict, to make and collect fees and charges
for customer connections to the works of the subdistrict
and such proceeds to be used to discharge any indebtedness
of the subdistrict.
The foregoing provisions indicate the various means
of raising revenue of which a subdistrict may avail itself,
and inasmuch as the Bountiful subdistrict's main purpose
for organization is that of distributing water, it would seem
feasible that such sources and possibilities would provide
adequate funds to effect the program contemplated. Admitting the convenience of obtaining funds through ad
valorem property taxation, we submit that convenience
alone is not an argument nor is necessity an argument, and
in the absence of authority to the contrary, a subconservancy district should not be entitled to a method of taxation
not express in nature, or otherwise indispensable.

POINT III
THE TITLE OF CHAPTER 120, LAWS OF
UTAH 1951, PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF SUBDISTRICTS, DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY APPRISE THE LEGISLATURE
THAT THE BODY OF THE ACT 'VAS TO
HAVE INCLUDED THE ALLEGED POWER
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OF AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION
BY SUBCONSERV ANCY DISTRICTS.
Most U. S. jurisdictions, Utah included, have adopted
constitutional provisions to the effect that the subject or
object of an act must be expressed or adequately described
in its title. Article VI, Section 23 of the Constitution of
Utah provides :
"Except general appropriation bills, and bills
for the codification and general revision of laws, no
bill shall be passed containing more than one subject,
which shall be clearly expressed in its title." (Emphasis added.)
50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Section 166, at page 146, states the
purpose of such constitutional provision to be as follows :
"The aim of the constitutional provision is to
give information as to the subject of legislation with
which the act deals, to apprise the members of the
Legislature, and the people, of the subject of legislation under consideration, or to challenge the attention of those affected by the act to its provisions, so
that they may have an opportunity of being heard
thereon if they so desire." (Emphasis added.)
The title of Chapter 120, Laws of Utah 1951, providing for
the organization of a subdistrict states:
"An Act Amending Section 100-11-14, Utah
Code Annotated 1943, as amended by Chapter 95,
Laws of Utah 1949, Relating to Water Conservancy
Districts and the Organization of Subdistricts, and
Providing the Method for Organizing such Subdistricts, for the Appointment of the Board of Directors and the Powers and Duties of Such Board."
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It is submitted that a reading of the title of Chapter 120
now codified as Section 73-9-14, U. C. A., 1953, does no1

adequately apprise nor reasonably call to the attention oj
the legislators or the public the object of the legislation
thereunder, if the power to levy an ad valorem property
tax is contained in the body of the act.
In the case of Percival v. Cowychee and Wide Hollow
Irrigation District, 15 Wash. 480, 46 P. 1035, the court held
that "a title which shows nothing more than that the act
is to provide for the organization and government of irrigation districts and the sale of bonds arising therefrom is
[not] broad enough to warrant the enactment thereunder
of a provision for the validating of the indebtedness of a
district which might have been organized thereunder and
the levying of a tax to pay the same." In that case the
court recognized that a title is sufficient if it directs the
n1inds of the legislators to propositions that are reasonable
or have a natural connection with the subject matter of
the title. The holding of the Percival case and the tests
mentioned were affirmed in the more recent case of Gruen
v. The Tax Commission, (Wash.), 211 P. 2d 651, where
the Washington Supreme Court stated:
"An act providing for the organization and
government of irrigation districts is not broad
enough to include validation of bonds and the levying of a tax."
Applying the above principles to the facts before us,
this court should find that the title of an act which provides
for the organization and government of a subdistrict is not
broad enough to wnrrant the enactment thereunder of a
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provision authorizing the levying of a general property
tax. Inasmuch as a title of an act is sufficient to the extent
that it directs the minds of the legislators to reasonable or
natural connections, there is serious doubt that Utah legislators considered the title of Chapter 120 as embracing
the power of ad valorem property taxation, since there is
no indication in either the title or body of the act that the
Legislature intended to include the general property tax
power.
In the case of Saville v. Corliss, 46 U. 495, 151 P. 51,
this court held that when the subject of an act is not clearly
expressed in the title, the act is invalid. If Chapter 120,
Laws of Utah 1951, is to be construed as including the
power of ad valorem property taxation, then the act must
be held invalid as contravening Section 23 of Article VI of
the Utah Constitution. Appellants contend, however, that
the act is void only if the substance of Chapter 120 includes
tax powers that would not be contemplated by the legislators or be reasonably brought to their attention by the title
of that act. The power to levy a general property tax is an
enlargement upon the subject matter contained in Chapter
120, Laws of Utah 1951, the title of which would not be objectionable if the act were interpreted as not including the
power to levy an ad valorem property tax.

POINT IV
TO ALLOW A SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICT
THE POWER OF AD VALOREM PROPERTY
TAXATION RESULTS IN DOUBLE TAXATION
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WHICH IS TO BE AVOIDED AND NOT PRESUMED.
If the lower court's conclusions of law are correct,

which we in no wise admit, then a subconservancy district's
ad valorem property tax levy, when added to the tax levy
of the parent district, results in double taxation. As a general rule of law, the courts will not favor double taxation
in any form unless the statutes so clearly require it that no
other construction is possible in reason. According to 51
Am. Jur., Taxation, Sec. 286, p. 340:
"While, as has been pointed out, it is not every
form of double taxation which will be considered
invalid, the courts are generally agreed that double
taxation in any form is not favored, but is to be
a voided, and that the intention of the legislature to
impose it will not be presumed. Before a tax statute
will be interpreted as providing for double taxation,
the intention so to do must be shown by clear and
unequivocal language which leaves no doubt as to
the legislative intent."
Double taxation exists if both taxes have been imposed
in the same year, for the same purpose, by the same taxing
authority, and upon property owned by the same person.
51 Am. Jur., Taxation, Sec. 284.
The "·eber Basin \Vater Conservancy District and
the Bountiful Subconservancy District are both clearly
levying an ad valorem property tax during the same year
and on the property of those persons within the subconservancy district area. The two corporations are also levying
the tax for identical purposes, i. e., water conservancy,
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inasmuch as both are alleged to have the same powers and
duties, and therefore could effectuate the same end program. This phase of dual taxation carries the attendant
danger that members of the subconservancy district are
paying twice for benefits that they are entitled to as participants in the parent district.
The close relationship between parent and subdistricts
indicates that the same taxing authority is levying both
taxes in question. According to Section 73-9-14, U. C. A.
1953, a prerequisite for the organization of a subdistrict
is the filing and acceptance of a petition by owners of real
property within the contemplated area of the subdistrict.
That section provides further :
"Such petition shall also contain a statement of
the quantity of water which the subdistrict proposes
to acquire from the district for perpetual use and
the court shall prior to the entry of its decree organizing a subdistrict require that the petitioner attach
to the petition certain evidence of the consent of the
board of directors of the district to furnish such
subdistrict the perpetual use of water for the purpose therein specified."
This provision would indicate such close relationship exists
between the parent and subdistrict that the same or closely
related authorities are levying the taxes in question. This
relationship and interdependence is further borne out by
Section 73-9-18, U. C. A. 1953, as amended.
Inasmuch as a tax law will not be construed to tax the
same property twice and there is a presumption against
an intention on the part of legislators to impose a double
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tax without specific expression to the contrary, this court
must avoid the dual burden attempted to be imposed herein.
Double taxation does not exist where a special assessments tax is added to an owner's existing general property
levy, and it is therefore not a dual burden if a subconservancy district is allowed the power of special benefits tax
even though the parent district may exact an ad valorem
property tax.
POINT V
THE NATURE OF A SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICT PRECLUDES THE NECESSITY OF AD
VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION.
We have previously herein discussed our conviction that
the "powers" meant to be conferred on subconservancy districts by Chapter 120, Laws of Utah 1951, were only those
enumerated in Section 100-11-13, Utah Code Annotated
1943, (73-9-13, U. C. A. 1953). If this legislative intent
is not clear from the statutory language, we believe it is
apparent from the nature of the entity "subdistrict" which
the legislature here created. The granting of a general tax
power to a taxing unit is predicated on the premise that
such a unit will promote a general benefit. It is generally
conceded, for instance, that an irrigation or drainage district may not levy a general property tax because the contemplated benefits will inure to particular lands rather
than the community as a whole. In Patterick v. Carbon
Water Conservancy District, supra, this Court recognized
the foregoing principle and distinguished a district organized under the Water Conservancy Act as being for a public
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purpose. Other cases noting the necessity of general community benefits to support a general tax levy include People
v. Letford, 102 Colo. 284, 79 P. 2d 274, and Cosman v.
Chestnut Valley Irrigation District, 74 Mont. 111, 238 P.
879.
Section 73-9-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, does not set out in detail the reasons why "subdistricting" is considered necessary or salutary. The language does suggest, however, that the purpose of a subdistrict would be to satisfy a need of local land owners
which is not common to the parent district. Such an appraisal of the subdistrict concept conforms with the Colorado statutes, wherein the Colorado Water Conservancy Act
provides for the organization of subdistricts, but makes no
provision for the exercise of ad valorem property taxation
powers. Moreover, the Colorado legislature, in creating the
Colorado River Conservancy District and the Southwestern
Water Conservancy District, recognized the peculiar needs
of those areas and in providing for the creation of subdistricts therein deviated from the provisions of the general
water conservancy act and expressly authorized ad valorem
property levies by the subconservancy districts.
For the purpose of satisfying local problems, a subdistrict may levy a special tax pursuant to Section 73-913 (f) and (I), Utah Code Annotated 1953. It may also derive
revenue from other sources, an enumeration of which we
have set forth in Point III herein. There is ample indication
that the legislature intended that a subdistrict acquire its
water from the parent district and the organizing petition
must contain a statement of the quantity of water the sub-
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district proposes to acquire, and the ratification by thE
parent district. The activity productive of a general com.
munity benefit is intended to be carried on by the parent
district.
The subdistrict on the other hand appears to be necessary as an organization only because a local problem exists
for which district funds could not be properly applied. The
prime example of such local problem is a distribution or
drainage system. Such would justify the organization of a
subdistrict in our view. The subconservancy district makes
sense only as a special improvement district. According to
the case of People v. Letford, supra, subdistricts, cities, irrigation districts and similar organizations who "become
liable for * * * special assessments through agreement with the water conservancy district themselves ascertain the amount of the benefit and the extent of their lia,.
bility in applying for the water which they deem necessary
for their purposes. These contracts are the basis for the
lien created by the act against the property of the applicant
for water". (Emphasis added.) The Colorado statutes organizing specific conservation districts mentioned above,
refer to subdistricts and improvement districts synonymously. Therefor the subdistricts should tax only those
lands directly benefitted by the improvement.
To further support our conviction as to the nature of a
subdistrict, we would like to direct the attention of the
court to Section 73-9-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, whereill
the organization requirements of a conservancy district
include a minimum assessed property valuation. This h
material in view of the ad valorem property taxation powe1
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of the district. In order for a district to make use of the
ad valorem tax power a minimum valuation requirement is
essential to insure that a significant amount will be derived
from any given levy. Contrast the foregoing valuation requirement with the provision in Section 73-9-14, U. C. A.
1953. A subdistrict under that section may be organized
irrespective of the value of the land or improvements therein. We submit that the foregoing difference in the requirements for organizing a subdistrict and main district is
further indication that the legislature had no intention of
giving the subconservancy district the power of general
property taxation and therefore was not concerned with a
requirement of land valuation for its organization.
The history of the Utah Water Conservancy Act indicates that the subconservancy districts have generally been
considered vehicles of water distribution and logically
should derive their revenues from users of the water
through the making and collecting of rates or fees or levying a special assessments tax where those who benefit most
would bear the commensurate burden.
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CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing authority and reasons, we
submit that the judgment and order of the lower court
should be reversed and this Court decree and direct that the
Board of County Commissioners of Davis County set aside
the general property tax levy proposed by the Bountiful
Subconservancy District.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
RAYMOND W. GEE,
Assistant Attorney General,
MILTON J. HESS,
County Attorney, Davis County,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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